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Mikael Mattlin    
 
The Chinese government's new approach to ownership 





This paper reviews recent regulatory and policy changes that affect the Chinese central 
government's ownership and authority over the capital allocations of strategic state-owned 
enterprises (SOE). The paper examines the reform of the central government's relationship 
with key SOEs as a consequence of the establishment of the State Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003, the coming introduc-
tion of a centralised operating and budgeting system for SOEs, and the government's ongo-
ing re-evaluation of its ownership policy. SASAC appears to have the potential to develop 
into a major actor in China's domestic capital allocation, with an active role in strategic fi-
nancing and restructuring of key sectors of the Chinese economy. The data reviewed for 
this paper strongly suggests that the Chinese central government aims to retain significant 
ownership control over key SOEs and, by extension, over a major part of the domestic 
economy. The new operating and budgeting system is set to significantly enhance central 
government control over SOEs' capital allocation. 
 
Key words: State-owned enterprises, privatisation, corporate governance, China 
JEL classification: G32, G38, P26, P31 
                                                 
1 The research for this report was done during a visiting research period at BOFIT, June-October 2006. The 
author would like to thank Iikka Korhonen, Tuuli Koivu, Matti Nojonen and Juuso Kaaresvirta for helpful 
comments to earlier versions of this paper, and Jouko Rautava, Xing Yuqing and Max Jussila for general 
discussions on the topic. Mikael Mattlin         
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Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Kiinan valtion omistajapolitiikkaa uusien säädösten ja viime-
aikaisten politiikanmuutosten valossa. Keskushallinnon ja keskeisten valtionyhtiöiden suh-
de on muuttumassa vuonna 2003 perustetun valtioneuvoston valtionomistuksen valvonta- 
ja hallintakomission (SASAC), tulevan keskitetyn valtionyhtiöiden toiminta- ja budjetoin-
tijärjestelmän ja meneillään olevan omistajapolitiikan uudelleenarvioinnin seurauksena. 
Kiinan sisäisissä pääomien kohdentamispäätöksissä valtionomistuksen valvonta- ja hallin-
takomissiosta näyttäisi kehittyvän merkittävä toimija, jolla on aktiivinen rooli keskeisten 
valtionyhtiöiden strategisessa rahoituksessa ja avaintoimialojen uudelleenjärjestelyissä. 
Tätä keskustelualoitetta varten koottu aineisto viittaa vahvasti siihen, että Kiinan valtio 
pyrkii omistajapolitiikallaan säilyttämään vahvan omistuksen keskeisissä valtionyhtiöissä 
ja sitä kautta myös vahvan roolin valtiontaloudessa. Uuden toiminta- ja budjetointijärjes-
telmän myötä keskushallinnon määräysvalta strategisten valtionyhtiöiden pääomien koh-
dentamisiin näyttäisi kasvavan merkittävästi. 
 
Asiasanat: valtionyhtiöt, yksityistäminen, yritysten hallintakäytäntö, Kiina 
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1  Introduction 
 
Despite three decades of economic reforms in the People's Republic of China (PRC), re-
structuring of large state-owned enterprise groups has proceeded at a slow pace in recent 
years. While a variety of different measures and reform models have been tried since the 
1980s, these have mostly been half-hearted or unsuccessful. The founding of the State As-
sets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003 
marks a new phase in efforts to deal with the outstanding challenges and unresolved prob-
lems of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The founding of SASAC launched a proc-
ess of redefining the relationship between central government and the so-called 'central en-
terprises' (中央企业) – the key SOEs that have been selected by the government to form 
the basis from which China's future top global companies will be created. Central enter-
prises account for the bulk of SOE profits and around a quarter of SOE corporate invest-
ment. This paper reviews recent legal and policy changes and case studies that illuminate 
the changes in this relationship, focusing on the issues of state ownership and state finan-
cial control over SOEs. The research question we ask is: to what extent and through what 
arrangements does the Chinese central government intend to maintain ownership and fi-
nancial control of the central enterprises? 
The Chinese government's commitment to the market versus the state has fluctuated 
over the course of the reform period. In the planned economy, state-owned enterprises 
were an integral part of the state budgeting system, with all their financing needs being 
covered by the state, and with profits and losses directly included in the state budget. In the 
late 1970s, more than half the budget revenues came from state-owned enterprises (World 
Bank policy note 2005, p. 2). The low incentives provided to SOE managers in this system 
led the government to experiment with various models of profit retention, such as the 'con-
tract management responsibility system', through which managers could retain a part of the 
profits after meeting government-set targets (Choe and Yin 2000, pp. 101–102). Following 
a tax reform in 1994, wholly-owned SOEs were exempted from paying dividends to the 
government. Between then and now, SOEs have retained almost all their post-tax profits. 
In 1994, the Company Law was also promulgated, providing a legal framework for 
SOE reforms (Lin and Wei 2006, pp. 124–125). The guiding principle of the SOE reform 
strategy became the expression 'zhua da, fang xiao' (抓大放小) or, grasp the big and let go Mikael Mattlin         
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of the small – a reference to a policy enshrined in the 9
th Five Year Plan (1996–2000) con-
centrating the government's resources on the larger SOEs, while relaxing state control over 
smaller SOEs. Government controls over enterprises' investment and management deci-
sions loosened, and government supervision in general progressively entered a state of dis-
array following the break-up of links between line ministries and enterprises, and the cor-
poratisation and partial public listing of big SOEs. Of late, it appears that the pendulum 
between state and market in the governance of SOEs has again swung in favour of a 
greater role for the state and against giving the markets more say. Several research and pol-
icy papers released by government agencies and government-linked research centres have 
lately been highly critical of the growing role of private and foreign interests in the econ-
omy, and argued that the government should retain control of key parts of the economy. 
The establishment of SASAC contains both centralising and decentralising features. 
On one hand, clearly separating central, provincial and municipal SOEs and handing con-
trol of them to SASAC offices at the respective administrative level clarified local control 
over local SOEs. On the other hand, by taking all central enterprises away from the control 
of various government agencies and putting them under the unitary supervision of an organ 
that reports directly to the State Council, central government appears to be asserting its au-
thority. SASAC strives to centralise several functions that were formerly dispersed over 
various government agencies and party organisations. Central-level SASAC handles the 
state's ownership interests as well as regulation and supervision of central enterprises,
2 
while the Ministry of Finance (MoF) retains overall responsibility for all state-owned en-
terprises as well as the financial matters of non-corporate entities, such as government 
agencies (Appendix 1, documents 16 & 17). SASAC's mandate does not cover financial 
organisations. In the financial sector, ownership and regulatory functions are more clearly 
separated. SASAC's ownership role is performed by the Central Huijin Investment Com-
pany (中央汇金投资有限责任公司), which is a controlling owner in some of the big 
state-owned commercial banks (SCBs), while supervision of financial organisations is the 
responsibility of the Central Banking Supervisory Committee (CBRC), and practical man-
agement of bad assets is performed by asset management companies (AMCs). 
Local SASACs at the provincial and city levels handle SOEs within their respective 
jurisdictions, with independent powers over SOEs delegated to the local level for the first 
                                                 
2 While it is recognised in China that ownership and regulatory functions need to be separated (Mako and 
Zhang 2004, p. 4), such a functional division does not appear to have been implemented in the case of SA-
SAC. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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time (Appendix 1, Document 4; see also Naughton 2006, pp. 3, 16). Although the central 
enterprises under SASAC management comprise only 159 major companies (at the time of 
writing),
3 their size and importance to the national economy in many respects surpasses 
that of all the other SOEs combined. Central enterprises account for roughly 70% of all 
SOE profits (representing 20% of government revenue), and their listed subsidiaries stand 
for one third of the entire valuation of Chinese domestic stock exchanges. The combined 
value of the assets of central enterprises amounted to around 1.2 trillion euro in 2006 (Xin-
hua 25 January 2007). 
SASAC has a broad mandate that includes drafting laws and regulations regarding 
state-owned assets, managing and restructuring state assets so that their value develops 
positively, and hiring and firing the executives of SOEs (who are equivalent to civil ser-
vants) under its supervision at the behest of the Communist Party, which ultimately retains 
the authority over key appointments. However, the legal basis for its mandate is unclear. 
The foundation for SASAC was laid during the 16
th Party Congress in 2002, which re-
solved to reform the management systems for state assets by emphasising that central and 
local government shall exercise their legal duties and rights as investors in state assets; that 
the management of (state) assets, people and matters shall be unified; and finally that the 
respective jurisdictions of the central and local levels of government as well as the roles of 
investors and managers need to be clearly demarcated and clarified in order to prevent 
overlapping authorities. 
During the process of setting up SASAC, the State Council official tasked with 
formulating SASAC's future role, Li Baomin, described SASAC's character through four 
negations: it would not be an administrative organ of the government, its personnel would 
not be civil servants, it would not be included in the formal government sector, and it 
would not have the same function as the former State Assets Bureau (国资局). SASAC 
exercises the rights of the principal investor in state assets, implying the rights to enjoy 
dividends from enterprise cash flow, to take major decisions regarding enterprises and to 
choose enterprise managers. In the State Council's organisational set-up, SASAC appeared 
for the first time in the spring of 2003. Officially, SASAC is defined as a ministerial-level 
'special organisation' reporting directly to the State Council (国务院直属特设机构).
4 Inci-
                                                 
3 The list can be found in Chinese on SASAC's website at <www.sasac.gov.cn>. The number of firms is 
slowly dropping due to SASAC-supervised restructuring and merging efforts. 
4 According to Naughton (2004, p. 12), this status was adopted to circumvent the National People's Congress. Mikael Mattlin         
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dentally, SASAC is the only organ in this organisation category, which appears to have 
been established exclusively for it. 
The legal position of SASAC is unclear, partly because China has yet to establish a 
law governing the control of state assets (Naughton 2005, p. 8; Chen 2005, p. 114). So far, 
only interim regulations on the management of state assets have been issued (in 2003) as 
well as various follow-up guidelines. However, SASAC's legal status is being indirectly 
established through other laws. In the new Company Law that took effect on 1 January 
2006 the section on wholly state-owned companies repeatedly mentions SASAC as the or-
ganisation that wields ultimate power in matters related to these enterprises. SASAC itself 
refers to the Company Law as one of the bases for its existence. The previous version of 
the law vaguely referred to 'state-authorised investment organisations or agencies' 
(国家授权投资的机构或者国家授权的部门). Nevertheless, apart from the references in 
the Company Law, there is as yet only a weak legal basis for SASAC's broad mandate 
(Appendix 1, documents 1 & 2). 
From an external perspective, SASAC has conflicting regulatory and ownership in-
terests, as its mandate combines both functions. Scattered case-based evidence suggests 
that SASAC has not been shy to use its de facto regulatory authority.
5 Lately, it has also 
started to exercise its ownership interests more actively. However, SASAC has many aux-
iliary aims, several of which are laudable, and some of which are more dubious. Among 
the more laudable aims is to get the asset stripping and corruption that had become a fester-
ing problem in SOEs under control by putting restrictions and strict requirements on own-
ership transfers, eg through management buy-outs (MBOs). Some sources note this as one 
of the key aims of putting the SOEs under unitary control (see eg Stratfor 27 May 2003). 
Among the more dubious facets of the reform is that an activist state, represented by SA-
SAC, may wreak havoc in the management of SOEs, eg by unnecessarily reshuffling en-
terprise management or letting local government meddle in the management of successful 
companies. Furthermore, while central government has a point in saying that SOE profits 
are not always reinvested in sound ways, there are no guarantees that a semi-governmental 
body with ambiguous goals and affected by political considerations will do a better job. 
The data used for this paper includes new regulations and policy papers that affect 
state ownership (Appendix 1), policy statements, illustrative case studies and statistical in-
                                                 
5 In a notable case, SASAC ruled that Haier, one of China's most successful companies, belongs to the Qing-
dao city government, and that management buyouts in big SOEs were forbidden (The Economist 1 September 
2005). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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formation mainly originating from the PRC National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Chapter 2 
provides a literature review. In Chapter 3, we examine attempts at re-defining the scope of 
state ownership with regard to which industries and enterprises the state will retain control 
of when restructuring the SOEs. Chapter 4 looks into the specific modes of maintaining 
state control in the future, following the share structure reform. In Chapter 5, we examine 
the new policies on SOE dividends and investments, focusing on the central enterprises. 
Finally, conclusions are presented in Chapter 6. 
 
 
2  Literature review 
 
State ownership of enterprises is a perennial political issue in many countries. For a num-
ber of years, the prevailing trend in Western economies has been for the state to retreat 
from direct ownership interests in commercial enterprises. However, there have lately been 
some signs of a possible turn in the tide, with increasing critique of excessive privatisation, 
in particular of utilities and public service providers, and political pressures against foreign 
acquisitions of formerly state-owned companies or national champions. In a few countries, 
primarily in Latin America and Russia, governments have even resorted to measures that 
smack of re-nationalisation, in particular of key energy assets (eg Reynolds and Kolodziej 
2006). Thailand is currently also considering putting an end to arrangements whereby 
shares with different voting rights have allowed foreign investors to circumvent foreign 
equity restrictions and gain control of Thai firms. 
There are good economic arguments for why certain enterprises ought to be priva-
tised, primarily the prospects of improving corporate efficiency and manager incentives 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1994). A long array of studies has attested to Chinese SOEs being 
less efficient than other enterprise forms (eg Xu et al. 2006). There are also sound argu-
ments for why the state ought not to exit other enterprises in certain circumstances, for ex-
ample, in industries prone to market failure or an insufficiently developed economic envi-
ronment (Zinnes et al. 2001). However, at the end of the day, where governments choose 
to draw the line between public and private ownership is an inherently political question, 
subject to prevailing political preferences. Practically all governments maintain ownership 
of some enterprises, most commonly utilities, public service providers, and defence com-
panies and, to a lesser extent, national flag carrying airline companies. In some market Mikael Mattlin         
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economies, such as the UK, privatisation efforts have gone a long way, while in others, 
such as Singapore, the state directly or indirectly still controls a substantial share of the 
economy. 
There are, generally speaking, four kinds of rationale for maintaining state owner-
ship. The economic sector in which the company operates may be deemed unsuitable for 
private companies, eg in the case of natural monopolies with high and non-profitable capi-
tal investment needs. The state may also have other than economic goals, such as softening 
the social blow in transitional economies downsizing the state sector. Alternatively, the 
state may adopt an investor role (often in the absence of strong private institutional inves-
tors), with an interest in promoting domestic economic development or in achieving good 
investment returns, as in the case of Singapore's Temasek Holdings. Finally, the state may 
wish to maintain its ownership for strategic reasons, related to national or economic secu-
rity. In this paper we chose to focus on the last two rationales for maintaining state owner-
ship, as they lie at the heart of the current policy debate within China on the future rela-
tionship between the government and key SOEs. 
Most governments consider some companies vital enough for national security for 
the state to maintain a controlling stake in them. Sometimes this understanding is tacit, 
while in other cases specific lists of strategic companies are compiled. For example, in 
2004 Russia compiled an extensive list of strategic companies in which the government 
needs to maintain control. However, the ways of maintaining government control differ. 
The most straightforward method in the case of shareholding companies is to simply retain 
an ownership stake in excess of 50%. In many countries state control is further reinforced 
by legal stipulations that require specific parliamentary approval (eg in Finland and Swe-
den) or presidential authorisation (eg in Russia) if state ownership is to drop below a con-
trolling stake. Another method is to give state shares disproportional control through spe-
cial voting or veto rights, so-called 'golden shares'. Such a system has been applied by Sin-
gapore (Shome 2006, p. 11; also Ang and Ding 2006), but several EU countries have also 
used golden shares to prevent foreign takeovers of their newly privatised 'crown jewels', a 
practice which the European Court of Justice has ruled incompatible with the EU's free 
movement of capital. 
For the past decade, China's 'model' for maintaining state control has been to retain 
a clear shareholding majority, commonly 55–70% of the share stock, as non-tradable 
shares in the hands of government agencies, wholly-state owned holding companies BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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(granted the right to act as a 'state-authorised investment organisation') or government-
linked legal persons, eg SCBs, policy banks or AMCs. However, this model is set to 
change, as all non-tradable shares are currently in the process of being converted into trad-
able shares. The share reform is examined in Chapter 4. 
In the case of profit-making enterprises, the state naturally also has an interest in 
the cash flow generated by the enterprises from operational profits, or through the proceeds 
from partial or complete privatisation. In most countries, the state collects dividends from 
its enterprises. Dividend and privatisation proceeds commonly go either directly to the 
treasury/finance ministry as general revenue, are directed to a social security fund, or are 
earmarked for a specific purpose such as reducing public debt. World Bank economists 
have advised that dividend proceeds should be directed to the treasury and be subject to 
standard budgeting processes in China, too (World Bank policy note 2005, pp. 6–9, 18–20; 
Mako and Zhang 2004, p. 35). 
Collecting dividends from SOEs could be considered a minimum level of influence 
over enterprise capital allocations. In the literature on dividends, taking away surplus cash 
from company managers is seen as a key rationale for the use of dividends, owners' thereby 
preventing managers from making unprofitable investment decisions on the back of exces-
sive funds (World Bank policy note 2005, pp. 4–5). Some governments retain broader in-
fluence over SOE finances and investments. In the PRC, as a legacy of the planned econ-
omy, the government has previously had very broad control over state companies. In this 
respect, it is an anomaly, both internationally and in relation to the PRC's own economic 
history, that the Chinese government currently does not collect dividends from state com-
panies. Since 1994, Chinese SOEs for the most part have not paid dividends to the state. 
However, stock market listed SOEs pay dividends to their non-listed parent companies. 
They in turn have, as a rule, retained all profits rather than passing them on to the govern-
ment (World Bank policy note 2005, p. 10), which for the most profitable SOEs suggests 
their parent companies are awash with cash. 
The precise reasons for the dividend exemption included in the 1994 tax reform are 
so mew hat u ncl e ar . H o w e ve r , at the  time , S O Es w er e  in dir e  str aits , w it h l o ts o f  lo ss-
making firms and few profitable ones. Consequently, collecting dividends for state coffers 
was not seen as a priority. Keeping the SOEs afloat was a more pressing concern. In this 
respect, the situation has changed in recent years. While there are still many loss-making 
SOEs, some parts of the state-owned economy are now highly profitable (see Chapter 5). Mikael Mattlin         
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In the context of the macro-economic debate on the Chinese economy's overheat-
ing, which has centred on excessive (and wasteful) investments, SOE retention of profits 
has risen onto the political agenda. World Bank economists have for years advised the 
Chinese government to start collecting dividends from SOEs in order to curb excessive en-
terprise investments and shore up state finances, in particular, shortfalls in the govern-
ment's social security commitments.
6 Over-capitalisation of some SOEs due to the morato-
rium on state dividend collection, in conjunction with politically influenced bank lending, 
contributes to over-investment in many industries. China's incremental capital-output ratio 
(ICOR) has been trending upwards since the early 1990s, implying that it takes more in-
vestment to produce the same output, although the returns on investment are perhaps not as 
low as commonly believed (Bai et al. 2006, pp. 16, 40).
7 
While SASAC represents the ownership interests of the Chinese state, it has not had 
actual control over the budgets and profits of the enterprises under its supervision (Naugh-
ton 2005, p. 6). This, however, is set to end. A potentially major change in the financial 
management of SOEs was decided on in principle in 2005, as a consequence of which SA-
SAC's role in guiding the major SOEs' budgets and investments may soon be greatly en-
hanced. Henceforth, SASAC will compile a 'state assets management budget' 
(国有资本经营预算) for the central enterprises that will consolidate the investment funds 
for the companies under its supervision and require that they turn over a portion of their 
post-tax profits to the state. When implemented, the reform is set to shift a significant share 
of the authority on allocating profits and guiding corporate investments from the individual 
enterprises to central government, and in the case of the central enterprises, probably to 
SASAC. 
While the collection of dividends from SOEs to state coffers is standard practice 
around the world, the possibility that the bulk of funds would be handed over to an organi-
sation with an ambitious industrial policy rather than commercial goals is unusual, and the 
international precedents from similar experiments with state-owned shareholding funds are 
generally not encouraging (Mako and Zhang 2004, pp. 9–12). Nonetheless, SASAC seems 
adamant on getting operational control of most of the funds generated by the central enter-
prises. The question of who controls state asset earnings and to what extent and for what 
purposes they will be collected, is inseparable from the larger issue of how the Chinese 
                                                 
6 Lately, the economic press has also picked up the issue, see eg Financial Times 4 October 2006. 
7 Goldstein and Lardy have noted that reported returns on foreign direct investments in China are also modest 
relative to returns on similar investments elsewhere (Goldstein and Lardy 2005, p. 13). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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government in the future will organise its state assets management, and what role SASAC 
will eventually have, which is why the issues are examined together in this paper. 
 
 
3  Redefining the scope  
of state ownership in policy and in practice 
 
One of the key issues in relation to the central SOEs is whether the government will seek 
to retain them as wholly or majority state-owned indefinitely, ie how broad the scope of 
future state-ownership will be. Given that almost all the biggest Chinese companies are 
currently state-owned, this issue is central when gauging the nature of future global Chi-
nese companies in general. In this chapter we tackle the question through two more spe-
cific issues, namely, the specification of lists of strategic and prohibited industrial sectors 
and stalled foreign acquisitions of SOEs. The next chapter then turns to look at the evolv-
ing modes of government ownership following the reform of the split share structure. 
Hardly any country is indifferent to the loss of important national assets, especially 
to foreigners, and often even the privatisation of formerly state-owned units becomes a 
highly political issue. The Chinese discourse on SOEs is full of terms that denote the im-
portance of certain companies and sectors, such as 'backbone enterprise' (骨干企业), 'pillar 
industry' (支柱产业) and 'central-level enterprise' (中央企业). However, until recently the 
Chinese government had not specifically defined which sectors it considered to be critical 
or strategic. The list of central enterprises was probably the best publicised proxy for 
which companies the Chinese central government will – at a minimum – not relinquish 
control of in the foreseeable future. Among the 159 companies currently listed are most 
companies that in other countries would be considered key to national security (energy and 
defence-related companies) and most other major companies outside consumer electronics 
and finance (car manufacturers, shipbuilders, telecom companies). 
In recent years the Chinese government has been probing for precise definitions of 
which of its industries and companies are strategically important enough for the state to 
maintain control of them ad infinitum, and how tightly these companies ought to be con-
trolled by the state. By the summer of 2006, there were indications that the government 
was finally in the process of drafting a list of named strategic industries where the state Mikael Mattlin         
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aims to maintain control. The specific industries were made public for the first time at the 
end of the year, when SASAC chair Li Rongrong revealed that seven sectors (among cen-
tral enterprises) are considered strategically important as they are related to national or 
economic security, and that the government has to maintain absolute control in these sec-
tors, through either sole ownership or an absolute controlling stake. The seven industries 
are defence, power generation and distribution, oil and petrochemicals, telecommunica-
tions, coal, aviation and shipping (Table 1). Many of the biggest and most profitable Chi-
nese companies operate within these seven industries. In all these sectors, the role of for-
eign and private investors would be restricted to participating in developing downstream 
petrochemical products and value-added telecom services. In addition, the state will also 
maintain significant absolute or relative controlling stakes in another group of industries, 
described as pillar and basic industries. Only a small share of the assets of the central SA-
SAC enterprises would then be sold off to non-state owners. 
 




Industries included  Ownership goal  Approximate 
number of com-
panies 












Defence, power generation and 
distribution, oil & petrochem, 
telecom, coal, civil aviation, 
shipping. 
 
Machinery, auto, IT, construc-
tion, steel, base metals, chemi-




Trading, investment, medicine, 
construction materials, agricul-
ture, geological exploration. 
Maintaining 100% state ownership or 
absolute control; increasing state-
owned assets in these industries. 
 
Absolute or conditional relative con-
trolling stake; enhancing the influence 
of state ownership even as the owner-
ship share is reduced where appropri-
ate. 
 
Maintaining necessary influence by 
controlling stakes in key companies; 
in non-key companies state ownership 















Sources: State Council opinion released 12 May 2006 (see Appendix 1, Document 18); exclusive Xinhua interview with SASAC chair Li Rongrong 
(State Council website 18 December 2006) and reporting on press conference with Li Rongrong explaining the rationale of the policy paper. 
 
The list of strategic sectors is fairly typical of similar lists of strategic sectors drawn up by 
other governments or established by practice. However, by including the restrictions in the 
second category the list becomes more expansive than the current practice in Western 
economies, as the second category also includes eg the car industry, construction and IT – 
sectors where government ownership commonly only has a minor role. The Russian ex-
perience shows that lists of strategic enterprises tend to be modified over time, adding or BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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dropping companies and industries from the list depending on changes in policy prefer-
ences. 
If the release of the list defines the limits of foreign and private investment in Chi-
nese SOEs in theory, then the government's recent handling of foreign merger and acquisi-
tion (M&A) cases have contributed to establishing the same limits in practice. In seeking 
empirical evidence on how big a chunk of the economy the state intends to maintain con-
trol of in the future, the government's attitude towards foreign attempts to acquire SOEs 
can serve as a litmus test. While much earlier foreign direct investment in China was in the 
form of greenfield investments, the number and value of acquisitions has been rising no-
ticeably in recent years, with foreign acquisitions and domestic deals amounting to USD 46 
bn in 2005, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers (Levine and Woodard 2006, p. 18).
8 
With overcapacity having been built in many industrial sectors in China over the 
past decade, foreign companies are choosing to buy up local companies rather than build or 
expand their own operations. Both industrial enterprises and private equity groups have 
actively sought to acquire Chinese companies. In particular, the massive influx of foreign 
private equity attempting to buy up significant Chinese enterprises appears to have caught 
the Chinese government off guard (The Economist 23 September 2006). As yet, no attempt 
has been made by a foreign investor to acquire a controlling stake in a central enterprise. 
We are therefore confined to reviewing attempts to acquire provincial- or city-level SOEs 
that have been stalled or blocked. There have lately been numerous such cases, enough to 
draw some tentative conclusions based on a cursory review of the most prominent recent 
cases (see Table 2). Nevertheless, it has to be noted that foreign enterprises announced 818 
acquisitions of Chinese companies in 2006 (International Herald Tribune 14 February 
2007). Only a small proportion of these were blocked. 
 
 
                                                 
8 China Daily reported announced M&A deals in 2005 worth USD 66 bn (China Daily 11 April 2006). Mikael Mattlin         
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Table 2. Selected stalled attempts to acquire Chinese companies since 2005 
 
Acquirer (origin) Target (main owner)  Industry  Targeted stake; government actions 
to date 
Carlyle Group (US)  Xugong Construction Ma-
chinery (city government) 
Machinery  85%; MofCom has stalled approval, 
and required that Carlyle's ownership 
stake be cut to 50% 
Schaeffler (GER)  Luoyang Bearing Group 
(owned by other SOE) 
Machinery  100%; ad hoc government inquiry 
following industry association resis-
tance, possibly defensive acquisition 
by local companies 
Citigroup-led consortium 
(US) 
Chenming Paper (provincial 
government) 
Paper  ~ 30% controlling stake; target rejected 





Finance  45% foreign stake; CBRC opposed  
foreign stake required to be cut to < 
25%  
Arcelor (FR-LUX)  Laiwu Steel (provincial go-
vernment) 
Steel  38.4%; local defensive merger; no 
government approval yet 
ThyssenKrupp (GER)  Tianrun Crankshaft (JV with 
60% local government owner-
ship) 
Auto parts  51%; provincial government approved, 
industry association objected, MoF-
Com has yet to approve 
ZF Group (GER)  Hangzhou Advance Gearbox 
Group (city government) 
Machinery  70%; target cancelled the deal after 3 
years of talk, possibly due to govern-
ment pressure 
Macquarie Bank (AU) 
and TPG-Newbridge 
(US) 
PCCW's (HK) assets (China 
Netcom and HK-banker) 
Telecom  100%; deal thwarted through SASAC-
administered Netcom and Hong Kong 
banker 
Caterpillar (US)  Xiamen Engineering Machin-
ery (city government) 
Machinery  Rejected by target with support from 
local industry association 
Note: The data for this table has been compiled from various news sources available on the Internet. 
 
The first observation that arises from the cases is that the stalled deals do not appear to be 
coincidental. According to Bloomberg, 27% of all leveraged buyout deals in China, the 
bulk of which are made by foreigners, were stalled in the government approval process in 
2006, compared with only 6% a year earlier (Bloomberg 18 December 2006). There are 
three plausible explanations for the troubles recently encountered by foreign companies 
seeking to acquire controlling or major stakes in Chinese SOEs. The first is the most 
straightforward: given a dearth of procedures and laws regulating such acquisitions, the 
Chinese government may have wanted to freeze approval of acquisitions pending the es-
tablishment of such ground rules. Alternatively, given the limited experience of Chinese 
SOEs in cross-border acquisitions and enterprise valuation, central government may simp-
ly be concerned to ensure that state assets are not sold off too cheaply. SASAC has strong-
ly criticised selling off assets 'on the cheap' to company managers. Then again, it could al-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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so be that the state for strategic or commercial reasons is unwilling to sell off even less cri-
tical assets, and that it is seeking various ways to prevent these sell-offs. 
If foreign acquisitions have been stalled mainly pending the release of more de-
tailed rules and procedures, and more precise definitions of strategic sectors, then most of 
the stalled foreign acquisitions should eventually be approved. However, the accumulating 
number of foreign acquisitions encountering problems is more likely to indicate that the 
Chinese government is not keen on allowing foreign control of key local companies. A re-
lated government apprehension is that private equity investors will eventually end up sell-
ing the Chinese company to a foreign industrial behemoth operating in the same field. 
Numerous Chinese government officials, industry leaders and research institutes have 
lately come out strongly against allowing foreign multinationals to acquire key local com-
panies or to create local monopolies through acquisitions. Prominent critics include the 
former head of the National Bureau of Statistics. 
Secondly, while the government's own previous regulations on foreign investment 
in various industries have proved to be an unreliable guideline for foreign acquisitions of 
Chinese companies, the newly released list of strategic and pillar sectors throws some light 
on why deals in certain industries have had trouble getting government approval. In par-
ticular, the machinery, telecom, steel and auto industries are all areas where the govern-
ment aims to maintain a high level of ownership and control. In comparison, several acqui-
sition deals have recently been approved in the food and retail industries. 
Thirdly, many of the new restrictive initiatives or ad hoc government reviews of 
foreign acquisitions of Chinese companies have been brought on by Chinese industry asso-
ciations or competing local firms that have urged the government to prevent Chinese com-
panies from falling into foreign hands and demanded government inquiries in several spe-
cific cases. The former has been the case at least in the steel, car, auto parts, machinery, 
bearing and cement industries, while the latter occurred in the machinery industry. This 
domestic pressure may have influenced new comprehensive regulations on foreign M&As 
that gave more leverage for the government to review and deny acquisitions. Chinese au-
thorities signalled throughout the spring and summer of 2006 that they were taking a closer 
look at foreign acquisitions and were in the process of drafting new rules governing foreign 
acquisitions. In August 2006, six ministries and government agencies jointly issued com-
prehensive regulations on foreign mergers and acquisitions (Appendix 1, Document 12). Mikael Mattlin         
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While the original impetus for the new attitude towards foreign investment may 
have been the failed takeover attempt by CNOOC of US oil company Unocal, which 
floundered on US domestic opposition, another case turned out to be pivotal in launching 
an active re-evaluation of foreign involvement in the economy, namely the attempt by 
American private equity investor Carlyle to acquire Xugong Group Construction Machin-
ery (XCMC). The Xugong case provoked a small storm of nationalism-tinged resistance in 
China; led to the drafting of an ad hoc policy paper restricting foreign ownership in the 
Chinese machinery industry (see Appendix 1, Document 25); and also influenced the hur-
ried drafting of the new regulations on foreign mergers and acquisitions. The Xugong case 
is briefly reviewed below.  
 
Case study: Carlyle's attempt to acquire Xugong and the role of SASAC 
Xugong is a state-owned enterprise and part of the Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group 
(XCMG), itself an SOE wholly-owned by the Xuzhou city government. The ownership structure 
is common among SOEs. Xugong is the largest truck maker in China, but a minor player globally. 
In October 2005, private equity group Carlyle offered to buy an 85% share of Xugong for USD 
375 million, an offer that XCMG accepted. The deal is one of the biggest private equity deals in 
China. Both the Xuzhou city government and the Jiangsu provincial government supported the 
deal. However, a Chinese competitor, Sany Heavy Industry, also with an interest in acquiring 
Xugong, launched an attack on Carlyle's acquisition attempt, drumming up nationalistic senti-
ments on the Internet. This led the State Council to organise an unprecedented debate lasting three 
days on foreign investments, to which a broad range of participants – excluding Carlyle – were 
invited. 
MofCom, whose approval was needed for the deal to pass, reportedly opposed it based on 
fears that Carlyle would later sell Xugong to a foreign firm operating in the same field (Financial 
Times 29 March 2006). Higher authorities have also held up a similar acquisition offer made by 
Caterpillar for Xiamen Engineering Machinery. MofCom has stalled approval of the Xugong deal 
for more than a year. In October 2006, newswires reported that Carlyle had agreed to lower its 
acquisition objective to 50% of Xugong's shares (Bloomberg 17 October 2006). However, Mof-
Com has yet to announce whether or not it accepts Carlyle's less ambitious offer, and recent news  
reporting suggest that Carlyle may be forced to reduce its stake further (eg International Herald 
Tribune 14 February 2007). 
Two features make the Xugong case particularly interesting. In the first place, the company 
operates in an industry where foreign investment is allowed according to the official Investment 
Catalogue (Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Industries). The M&A regulations specifically BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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state that the restrictions on foreign investment cannot be violated as a consequence of a merger or 
an acquisition. In economic areas that require Chinese controlling ownership, foreign investors 
cannot take majority ownership through acquisition. In economic areas where a Chinese partner is 
required, the foreign investor cannot set up a wholly owned company through an acquisition. And 
finally, in prohibited areas, no merger and acquisition activities are allowed. However, the 
Xugong case and several other recent acquisition attempts that have stalled do not violate these 
restrictions. It also requires some stretch of the imagination to say that a medium-sized truck 
maker is vital to national security. Instead, it would seem that it is the more ambiguous arguments 
of 'economic security', 'key industries' and 'well-known companies' in the new M&A regulations 
that are invoked by the Chinese authorities in this case. 
Secondly, the case has brought to light the lack of clarity in review procedures; in particular 
regarding which government agencies have the authority to approve or deny which acquisitions. 
In the case of foreign acquisitions, the Ministry of Commerce is the decision-making centre ac-
cording to the regulations on foreign M&As. However, in this case, MofCom asked central SA-
SAC to review the case and submit an opinion, even though Xugong is not on the list of central 
enterprises, but under the administration of the Xuzhou city government, and therefore should 
belong to the authority of the local SASAC. Formally, local SASACs are not under the
  direct 
control of central SASAC, although the latter in practice wields a great deal of influence over 
them (Naughton 2006, pp. 16–17). Regulations issued by central-SASAC itself define its relation-
ship with local SASACs as one of guidance and supervision. These regulations specifically state 
that central-SASAC may not interfere in the work of local SASACs that is carried out in accor-
dance with the law (Appendix 1, Document 8, Art. 13). On the other hand, if laws and regulations 
are not followed, central SASAC has the authority to correct local SASACs (Art. 15). 
The division of labour between MofCom and SASAC appears to be that MofCom has to de-
cide whether the acquisition will endanger national security or lead to a monopoly as well as ap-
prove the newly created foreign-invested enterprise following the foreign acquisition of a Chinese 
company, while SASAC sees to it that the process is conducted correctly in terms of procedures 
and that the assets are not divested at an undervalued price. In a recently released circular, SA-
SAC stipulated that state assets sold to foreigners, as a rule, should be sold through official asset 
exchanges (产权交易市场) rather than through direct contractual transfers (Appendix 1, Docu-
ment 19). While it is, in principle, easy to understand the division of authorities (see Appendix 4 
for all the main authorities involved) according to which MofCom has the most important say in 
foreign acquisitions and investments and SASAC in ownership transfers that involve state assets 
(with the CSRC also becoming involved when the deal involves a listed company), in practice this 
arrangement may cause authority overlaps, especially in cases which involve a foreign acquisition 
of a listed Chinese SOE. Mikael Mattlin         
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In the cases listed in Table 2, SASAC opposition to the proposed acquisitions has not been 
particularly prominent. Indeed, in most cases it has duly approved the acquisitions, as in the 
Xugong case. However, both central and local SASACs may have had an indirect influence on 
several acquisition cases. SASAC was probably involved in launching merger talks between Avic 
1 – a defence-related central enterprise – and Luoyang Bearing, whose indigenously developed 
bearings are used in the Chinese space programme. There have also been rumours of other SOEs 
possibly acquiring Luoyang. In the case of Bright Dairy, the Shanghai SASAC and local govern-
ment together engineered a merger with three other SOEs, which, coming on the heels of Da-
none's raising its stake in Bright, looks like an attempt to dilute Danone's holding. The adamant 
refusal of China Netcom (another central enterprise) to accept two foreign private equity groups' 
competitive bidding for PCCW's assets, a deal which would have made it a 100% profit on its 
20% stake (Holcombe 2006), left many wondering whether Netcom operated on government in-
structions. Finally, the Guangdong provincial government reportedly received SASAC approval 
for selling a 19.4% stake in Southern Power Grid – a central enterprise – to two other central en-
terprises, State Grid and Huaneng Group, in order to finance the bailout of GDB. The Citigroup-
consortium's acquisition was eventually approved as the foreign ownership share dropped below 
25%. Most of the shares in GDB went to SOEs. 
 
The new M&A rules are more detailed than earlier provisional rules promulgated in 2003. 
While the rules contained some good news for foreign investors, such as increased possi-
bilities to use share swaps when making acquisitions, some other parts of the regulations 
may make foreign investors think twice before attempting to acquire a Chinese company. 
Henceforth, all bigger acquisitions have to be approved by the authorities, with the rules 
handing ultimate decision-making power to the Ministry of Commerce (MofCom). The 
new M&A regulations also call for acquiring companies to submit to MofCom review if 
there is a possibility that Chinese 'economic security' is endangered; if well-known brands 
and trademarks are involved; or if acquisitions involve important companies or occur in 
'key industries' (重点行业), without defining which specific industries are referred to. Pre-
sumably, these industries are the same as on the new list of strategic and pillar industries. 
A number of deadlines need to be met by the concerned parties. If they are not met, 
MofCom can demand that the acquisition is cancelled (Appendix 1, Document 12, Art. 12–
13), opening up the possibility that deals may be rejected at least partly due to technicali-
ties. MofCom can also reject the acquisition if it considers that it materially impacts on the 
economic security of the state, without specifying clear criteria for when acquisitions are 
permissible and when not. These requirements are new in the 2006 regulations. They were BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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not present in the previous regulations promulgated three years ago (Appendix 1, Docu-
ment 17). 
The low thresholds set for governmental review of cases that may result in the 
forming of monopolies were already included in the 2003 regulation (Appendix 1, Docu-
ment 12, Art. 51–53). As previously, the regulations determine five specific situations in 
which the transacting parties have to submit the acquisition case for review by MofCom 
and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) before announcing its 
intentions publicly. Namely, when: 
￿  the Chinese assets owned by a party to the transaction exceed 3 billion yuan 
￿  the revenue of a merging party in the Chinese market has exceeded 1.5 billion yuan in the 
year in question 
￿  the aggregate Chinese market share of a merging party and its affiliated enterprises has 
reached 20% 
￿  the aggregate market share in the Chinese market by a merging party or its affiliated enter-
prises will reach 25% as a result of the merger or acquisition 
￿  as a result of the merger or acquisition one party will hold, directly or indirectly, equity in 
more than 15 foreign-invested enterprises engaging in related businesses in China 
 
Also, unchanged in the regulations are the four circumstances in which the parties to the 
merger are required to notify MofCom and the SAIC, namely when: 
 
￿  one party's revenue in the Chinese market exceeds 1.5 billion yuan in the year in question 
￿  more than 10 acquisitions have occurred in China in related industries within a year 
￿  the Chinese market share of a party to the transaction has reached 20% 
￿  the Chinese market share of a party to the merger or acquisition will reach 25% as a result 
of the transaction 
 
If any of the four criteria are fulfilled, a report should be submitted. In addition to the abo-
ve criteria, the regulations stipulate that even if none of the above criteria is fulfilled, a re-
port can still be requested if a competitor, a related government agency or an industrial as-
sociation so requests, or if MofCom or the SAIC believes that the acquisition will have a 
major effect on market shares, or if there are other important factors due to which the ac-
quisition will have a major effect on market competition. In other words, in principle a re-
port can be demanded of any foreign investor attempting to acquire a Chinese company. Mikael Mattlin         
 
The Chinese government's new approach to ownership 
and financial control of strategic state-owned enterprises 
 
  24
Upon receiving a full set of documents, and if they believe that the merger will re-
sult in excessive market concentration or have a detrimental effect on sound competition or 
consumer interests, MofCom and the SAIC together or separately then have to convene a 
hearing open to 'government agencies, organisations, enterprises and other affected parties', 
following which they will decide whether or not they approve the acquisition. This some-
what unusual practice was already contained in the previous version of the regulation, but 
apparently it had seldom if ever been used prior to the Xugong case. In addition, MofCom 
approval of the acquisition is specifically required in a number of cases, eg in all instances 
of share swap acquisitions and all cases of round-trip investment (Chinese investment 
routed through third locations). Articles 51–53 of the M&A regulations partly substitute 
for the anti-monopoly law that has not yet been passed. 
China publishes an intermittently revised official catalogue on FDI, the Catalogue 
for the Guidance of Foreign Industries ('Investment Catalogue'), which outlines in which 
industries investments are prohibited, restricted or encouraged (see Appendix 2 for a list of 
economic areas with foreign ownership restrictions in the current Investment Catalogue). 
Some of the stalled acquisitions are in formally approved industries, a fact that has taken 
foreign investors aback. A new round of investment guideline revision is apparently again 
under way. In addition, a separate, detailed list of industries in which foreign ownership is 
restricted, and industry-specific M&A policy guidelines are reportedly under preparation 
by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 
The heated internal debate on the role of foreign and private interests in the Chinese 
economy is likely to affect several impending laws. For example, the draft anti-monopoly 
law includes a section on mergers and acquisitions in line with international standards. In 
so far as enterprise mergers could result in the formation of monopolies they have to be 
reported to and examined by the authorities. However, according to media reports, a con-
troversial section on administrative monopolies has been watered down. Administrative 
monopolies are mainly maintained by Chinese companies in collusion with local govern-
ment, whereas monopolies formed through the market and M&A include many foreign 
companies. 
The view on foreign acquisitions is, however, not uniform within the Chinese gov-
ernment. Given the chorus of concerns raised by foreign governments and media about the 
new anti-monopoly law targeting foreign firms strong in China, MofCom apparently felt 
compelled to dispel some of these fears. In an interview with a Chinese newspaper, the di-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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rector of MofCom's research centre on transnational corporations, Wang Zhile, stated that 
there are no industries in China where foreign companies have established monopolies; on 
the contrary, most monopolies are maintained by SOEs. Wang also stressed that foreign 
investment is welcome and beneficial to the Chinese domestic economy (Bloomberg, 25 
August 2006). 
Nevertheless, the last two years have seen a string of industrial policies that in-
crease restrictions on foreign investors in the Chinese market, which suggests that the gov-
ernment has adopted a more selective attitude towards foreign investments. Commonly, 
these put limitations on foreign companies buying up a majority stake in a Chinese com-
pany operating in the sector, require a higher local content in products or new research cen-
tres, or require that foreign investors report and seek approval for their acquisition inten-
tions from Chinese authorities. The new approach to foreign investment was enshrined in a 
document (Appendix 1, Document 21) produced by the NDRC as part of the 11
th five-year 
plan. The document was published in November 2006, and it is the first time that the gov-
ernment's FDI policy has been included in a five-year plan. Appendix 3 provides brief 
summaries of industry-specific policy and legal changes that affect foreign ownership in 
selected major industries. 
 
 
4  New approach to organising state ownership 
 
China has never embraced privatisation of state-owned enterprises as a central policy goal. 
While the ownership structure of many smaller SOEs has seen changes over the years and 
the total number of SOEs has been substantially reduced through mergers, bankruptcies 
and divesting of small SOEs, from over 250,000 in 1995 to 127,000 in 2005 (Imai 2006, p. 
5; Xinhua 18 December 2006), in most cases 'privatisation' has involved ownership shifting 
into the hands of local government officials or company managers, not always in a trans-
parent manner.
9 With regard to the largest and most important companies, the likelihood of 
any significant privatisation in the foreseeable future is even more remote. Instead, the aim 
has been to enhance the operations of the state-owned sector of the economy through cor-
poratisation (Clarke 2003). 
                                                 
9 Due to lack of space, management buyouts in state-owned enterprises are not dealt with directly in this pa-
per. Readers are referred to earlier writings by Barry Naughton on this issue (eg Naughton 2005). Mikael Mattlin         
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The Chinese government was quick to recognise the benefits from corporatisation, 
ie turning SOEs from directly state-owned into stock companies. The corporatisation re-
forms started in the late 1980s. By August 1997, some 9,000 SOEs had gone through the 
process (Xinhua 18 December 2006), which allowed them to list partly or wholly on the 
stock market.
10 But the state was anxious not to lose control of its assets. Consequently, the 
so-called split share structure (股权分值) was set up. This system divided shares into 
tradable shares openly exchanged on the market, and non-tradable shares held by the state 
or state-linked legal persons  (法人股) and not subject to open trading. Non-tradable 
shares could, however, be exchanged outside of the market in a number of ways; through 
agreed sale, indirect takeover, free or judicial transfers, or entrusted shares (Green 2003, 
pp. 4–5). Until recently, non-tradable shares accounted for up to 2/3 of the market value of 
all listed companies, which created stock pricing problems and prevented the use of stock-
based incentives. Besides the distinction between tradable and non-tradable shares, stocks 
of Chinese companies are divided into several share classes. A shares are domestically 
traded shares traded in yuan in Shanghai or Shenzhen and open to domestic investors and 
select foreign institutional investors. B shares are shares in Chinese companies traded in 
China but in foreign currency. B shares were initially open only to foreigners, but are now 
open also to domestic investors with a foreign currency account (on B share restrictions, 
see Ji 2005, pp. 12–13). H shares are the shares of Chinese companies traded in Hong 
Kong or listed on foreign stock markets. 
More than 80% of the companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock ex-
changes are still state-owned enterprises. Knowing the history of the Chinese stock market 
and China's economy, this should not surprise anyone. When the stock markets were set up 
in the early 1990s, practically all Chinese companies were state-owned, with the remainder 
mainly collectively owned ('township and village enterprises'). Furthermore, the stock 
markets were set up mainly in order to take some of the burden of financing the massive 
social obligations of SOEs directly out of state coffers. The CSRC, which has the authority 
to approve or deny stock listings, has had a bias in favour of SOEs (like the SCBs in lend-
ing decisions); most listings approved were of state-owned enterprises, while private enter-
prises found it difficult to list on the Chinese exchanges. Companies therefore sometimes 
                                                 
10 Recent official comments suggest that the eventual goal is to make all but a handful of companies share-
holding enterprises. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/ 2007 
 
  27
seek a backdoor listing through acquiring a listed company (Green 2003, pp. 4–6). New 
regulations on stock market listings aim at tackling this problem. 
Initially, the government chose to list mainly subsidiaries of SOEs – commonly the 
best assets – on the market. A model followed in most listed SOEs was to create a separate 
corporatised subsidiary to the wholly-owned SOE and list the subsidiary on the stock mar-
ket, with the wholly state-owned parent company retaining a majority of shares as non-
tradable shares. In some cases, a number of subsidiaries have also been separately listed. 
Such a model was applied in the case of Sinopec, presented as an illustrative case study 
below. SASAC would apparently like to end the practice of listing only subsidiaries and 
replace it with full listings (整体上市) whenever possible – a practice which has a prece-
dent in the banking sector, where the SCBs have already listed in full rather than in part. 
Furthermore, SASAC has indicated that it may as early as 2007 assume direct ownership 
of some listed SOEs. 
The goal of maintaining state control while raising funds was effectively achieved 
with the split share structure. However, a dilemma was created. Given the dominance of 
non-tradable shares on the market, whenever the state aired its intention to sell down its 
shares in some SOEs, the market slumped due to fears of newly tradable shares flooding 
the market. The government was forced to abandon two earlier attempts at reform in 1999 
and 2001. In order to ameliorate the effects of the current round of share reform, the gov-
ernment decided that the holder of non-tradable shares has to compensate owners of trad-
able shares by offering them new shares or cash compensation. By making its shares trad-
able and by diluting its ownership, the share structure reform could be seen as lessening 
government control of its publicly traded shares. However, as the case below shows, the 
opposite may in fact occur. 
 
Case: Sinopec and the non-tradable share reform 
The ownership control structure previously favoured by the Chinese government in the case of 
large SOEs was to retain a non-listed traditional SOE as a holding company and parent to a corpo-
ratised and listed subsidiary. For example, non-listed Baosteel Group is the parent of listed Baos-
han Iron & Steel, while non-listed China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group) is the parent 
of listed China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (Sinopec Corp.). Given the legacy of SOEs as 
providing numerous welfare benefits to present and former employees as well as their family 
members, SOEs were saddled with social responsibilities, which were usually left with the non-Mikael Mattlin         
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listed company, while the best productive assets were transferred to the listed subsidiary.  Not 
surprisingly, parent companies are usually loss-making while the subsidiaries are profitable. Par-
ent losses are commonly covered by the profits of listed subsidiaries (Imai 2006, pp. 12–14; 
Naughton 2006, p. 8). 
Sinopec is arguably one of the most important Chinese companies. Whether by revenue, prof-
its, market value or market weight, it is one of the biggest Chinese enterprises. Sinopec Corp. is 
the fourth largest company and biggest non-financial company on the Shanghai stock exchange. 
In terms of its structure – a wholly state-owned parent company and a majority state-owned listed 
subsidiary, with several separately listed subsidiaries – Sinopec is a typical major Chinese SOE, 
and also a typical company on the Chinese stock markets. Following the Chinese government's 
determination to implement reforms that would invigorate the languishing local bourses, Sinopec's 
ownership structure has seen several changes. 
 



















Note: The mark * refers to non-tradable shares. 
 
After the H and A share listings in 2000-01, the state directly held 55.06% of the shares in 
Sinopec Corp. through Sinopec Group (Figure 1). Together with legal person shares, state-related 
institutions held 77.42% of all shares. Sinopec Group later acquired some of the shares held by 
legal persons. In the autumn of 2006, Sinopec Corp. completed its conversion of non-tradable into 
tradable shares, as one of the last major listed SOEs to do so. In conjunction with the share con-
version, Sinopec Group further redeemed almost all remaining legal person shares. To compen-
sate minority shareholders for the conversion, all A-share holders were given 2.8 newly tradable 
shares for every 10 shares they already held. H-share holders, however, did not receive any com-
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pensation. Since 2001, the state-controlled shares owned by the parent company have thus actu-
ally increased substantially even following the share compensation scheme, rising from 55.06% to 
75.84%. In the process, legal person shares have almost been eliminated, while minority share-
holders' ownership in Sinopec Corp. has increased only marginally (Figure 2). 
 



















In conjunction with the share conversion, lock-up periods for newly tradable share sales were im-
posed and a timetable was mapped out, with 5.67% of shares open for trading one year after the 
implementation of the reform, a further 5.00% after two years, and the rest of the shares (65.84%) 
tradable three years after commencement of the implementation phase (Source: Sinopec share-
holder notification on share conversion, 28 September 2006). This conforms to a general rule on 
share sales stipulating that no more than 5% of shares may be sold 1 year after implementation of 
the reform, another 5% after 2 years, and the rest after 3 years. The timetable effectively imposes 
a temporary moratorium on actual share sales. Even if the state will eventually sell down its 
shares in some companies, it will take until 2008–2009 before significant ownership changes can 
be observed.  
Several of the current restructuring issues affecting Sinopec are common to other SOEs, and a 
legacy of the piecemeal way in which SOE changes and market reforms in general have been pur-
sued in China. The complicated group structure of Sinopec is one such issue. The fact that 
Sinopec first listed a dozen subsidiaries, in which it usually remained the majority owner, before 
the mother company itself listed, was probably a combination of the need to raise cash, difficulties 
in valuing the company as a whole, government fears of losing control of the core of the com-
pany, and the perceived need for trial runs before the mother company was listed. The listed par-
ent (Sinopec Corp.) has retained a major influence in its listed subsidiaries, controlling the ap-
pointment of management, the board of directors and the supervisory board (Tobin 2003, pp. 7, 
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15–18). In its 2000 listing prospectus, Sinopec Corp. pledged to gradually consolidate its sepa-
rately listed subsidiaries into the parent in order to streamline corporate structures and eliminate 
internal competition. This consolidation process began with the sale of Sinopec Hubei Xinghua to 
the State Development & Investment Corporation, a SASAC-administered company newly turned 
into an AMC on a trial basis. The process has gathered pace since 2004, with Sinopec Corp. buy-
ing up more than half of its listed subsidiaries and divesting two subsidiaries to other central en-
terprises (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Sinopec Corp.'s de-listings and acquisitions of its listed subsidiaries 
 
Name of listed subsidiary  Ownership  Current  Time of 
  share before       ownership  delisting        
Sinopec Hubei Xinghua  57.58%  0%  2002 
Sinopec Beijing Yanhua 70.01%  100%  2004 
Sinopec Wuhan Phoenix *  40.72%  0%  2004 
Sinopec Zhenhai Refining & Chemical  71.32%  100%  2005 
Sinopec Qilu Petrochemical  82.05%  100%  2006 
Sinopec Yangzi Petrochemical  84.98%  100%  2006 
Sinopec Zhongyuan Petroleum  70.85%  100%  2006 
Sinopec Shengli Oilfield Dynamic group  26.33%  100%  2006 
Sinopec Wuhan Petroleum Corp.**  46.25%  (0%)  in progress 
Sinopec Shijiazhuang Refining Chemical**  79.73%  (0%)  in progress 
Sinopec Shandong Taishan Petroleum  38.68%  38.68%  - 
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemical  55.56%  55.56%  - 
Sinopec Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co.  42.00%  42.00% - 
Data sources: Company annual reports, Sinopec website, Shanghai stock exchange, Xinhua, China Daily, Netease stock infor-
mation. 
 
* Sinopec Corp. swapped its ownership stake in Sinopec Wuhan Phoenix for petrochemical assets from Guodian Group (a cen-
tral SASAC enterprise) and Qingjiang Water Power Investment. 
** Sinopec Corp. signed an agreement to sell its stake in Wuhan Petroleum to an investment company seeking a backdoor list-
ing, but simultaneously bought up all Wuhan's assets. Shijiazhuang Refining will similarly sell all its assets to Sinopec Corp. 
while the company shell is used for a backdoor listing. 
 
Buying up subsidiaries and related companies is not a trend confined to Sinopec, although 
Sinopec's case is the most prominent. SASAC has encouraged the internal consolidation of big 
enterprise groups, the integration of upstream and downstream companies into the same group, 
and the comprehensive listing of related assets on stock markets. For example, PetroChina has 
also similarly acquired and de-listed its subsidiaries, while Chalco (Aluminium Corp. of China) BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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has integrated its upstream and downstream production chains. If SASAC's wish is fully carried 
out, the Chinese stock markets will see major changes in the near future. At the end of March 
2006, only about half of the central enterprises (87) had listed parts on the stock market with A 
shares. However, these enterprises held as many as 186 separately listed entities (Zhongguo 
zhengjuan bao 22 March 2006). 
In the case of Sinopec, the legal person share redemptions and subsidiary acquisitions so far 
more than outweigh the state share dilution that occurred as an immediate consequence of the 
share reform. At least until now, the state's ownership control (through Sinopec Group) of 
Sinopec's productive assets has been considerably enhanced in recent years, rather than reduced. 
This also gives the state stronger control of tremendous cash flows that can be used to finance 
government priorities. Together with PetroChina and CNOOC, the three oil giants stand for about 
40% all SOE profits (see Figure 3 and Table 5). Following the publication of the list of strategic 
industries, it is highly unlikely that the state will sell down its stake in any of these companies. 
 
When analysing the share reform, we should keep in mind the distinction between convert-
ing shares from non-tradable to tradable on paper, and actually selling them on the market. 
When the government announced plans for its share reform, much news reporting assumed 
this meant that the state aimed to sell down its ownership, or even privatise listed SOEs. 
While it is likely that the state will sell a part of its massive shareholdings, it is by no 
means certain that even a significant part of newly tradable shares will be sold. 
Policy guidelines jointly issued in August 2005 by several government agencies 
(Appendix 1, Document 14) unequivocally state that the objective of the share reform is 
not to reduce state holdings, only to make non-tradable shares tradable, and that at the 
moment the state has no plan to use state share sales to raise capital on the market. These 
guidelines, as well as SASAC's own guidelines on the share reform (Appendix 1, Docu-
ment 15) also indicate that controlling shareholders, ie the state-owned parents, have to 
propose a minimum ownership stake they have to retain in accordance with the strategic 
layout of the state-owned economy and objectives for its' restructuring. This proposal, as 
well as all state share sales, has to be approved by SASAC. Similarly, when an enterprise 
board proposes the details of its plan to transform non-tradable shares into tradable ones, 
the board's proposal needs to be approved in each individual case by SASAC. The dual na-
ture of SASAC is evident here, as SASAC itself ultimately represents the biggest owner of 
most major SOEs (the state) at the same time as it is the regulator of state asset sales. Mikael Mattlin         
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Furthermore, the regulations state that central government should retain controlling 
interests in companies in 'pivotal industries' that are key to national security, without speci-
fying which industries and companies it has in mind. The later released list of strategic and 
pillar industries, however, gives strong indications of which industries this refers to. While 
limited in numbers, the companies on this list have a disproportionate weight on the stock 
market. Furthermore, the guidelines also demand that the government has to secure control 
of key industries and sectors, if necessary by the holders of state-owned shares increasing 
their share holdings through market transactions. Interestingly, in conjunction with the re-
lease of the list of strategic industries, it was also mentioned that the state should increase 
the share of state assets in these industries. 
Comments from high-ranking SASAC and CSRC officials provide further evidence 
of the state's intention to maintain or even strengthen control of major parts of the state-
owned economy and only sell stakes very gradually, precluding any large-scale privatisa-
tion. Li Rongrong has said that the state needs to 'both advance and retreat' at the same 
time. This would seem to imply that the state is going to sell-down its ownership in non-
core assets, while using the funds to increase its ownership in enterprises deemed strategic. 
Similarly, China's top securities regulator, Shang Fulin, chairman of the CSRC, said in a 
statement issued at the onset of the share reform that '[t]he country still needs to hold 
enough shares to absolutely or comparatively control pivotal companies after making all 
shares tradable' and that state shares will only be sold very gradually (Bloomberg 27 June 
2005). These statements are consistent with the reform strategy coined in the 'grasp the big, 
let go of the small' phrase incorporated in the 9
th five-year plan. However, neither the con-
ditions nor the specific policies for withdrawal from ownership have yet been specified 
(Chen 2005, p. 104), at least publicly. 
Judging from these statements, and contrary to what some observers seem to be-
lieve (eg Business Week 21 July 2006), it is erroneous to talk of any general privatisation 
programme in China. More appropriate perhaps would be to characterise the central gov-
ernment agenda with regard to its ownership interests as portfolio rationalisation. Recur-
ring themes in official comments are, on one hand, the diversification of ownership, and, 
on the other hand, the continuing leading role of state ownership in the Chinese economy. 
The goal appears to be to find the optimum mix between retaining control of strategic parts 
of the state-owned economy and maximising the raising of cash through selling non-core 
assets and minority shares in core assets, as well as 'normalising' the operation of the Chi-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




11 SASAC is now encouraging SOEs that have previously listed on for-
eign markets to list domestically (including in Hong Kong). 
In terms of the specific modes of maintaining its control of these 'pivotal' enter-
prises, the government has previously favoured simply retaining a clear majority of shares 
in those of its companies that have been converted into shareholding corporations. In Sino-
foreign joint ventures, the 50/50 ownership principle has been favoured by the authorities, 
and many sectoral liberalisation debates (see Investment Catalogue in Appendix 2) have 
earlier revolved around whether and when this requirement would be loosened. Govern-
ment-linked scholars have argued that the state does not necessarily need to retain an abso-
lute share majority in order to maintain control over SOEs; it could rather use a relative 
majority in a situation of highly diversified ownership (Zhang 2002, pp. 174–175) or 
golden shares (Chen 2005, p. 106) to achieve the same aim. In principle, the Company 
Law allows for the creation of golden shares, as it only states that shares within the same 
class shall enjoy the same rights (Appendix 1, Document 1, Art. 126–133). However, so 
far the Chinese government has regarded ownership exceeding 50% as a sturdier defence 
of its ownership control. In conjunction with the release of the list of strategic industries, 
Li Rongrong mentioned the possibility of using conditional relative controlling stakes in 
some enterprises, which may indicate a more diversified arsenal of means to maintain state 
control in key enterprises. 
Finally, regarding the future modes of strategic management and restructuring of 
state ownership, SASAC is also experimenting with new models. In December 2006, Li 
stated that China is considering creating new asset management companies to deal with 
SOEs, and that SASAC would assume direct ownership over some central enterprises as 
soon as 2007. However, if all central enterprises in China were subjected to the same 
AMC, that would create a tremendous concentration of assets in the Chinese economy, 
with combined assets on a par with the world's biggest bank, Citigroup. It is therefore more 
likely that SASAC will set up several AMCs as in the financial sector, where Central Hui-
jin Investment performs similar owner and asset oversight roles as SASAC, while four 
AMCs take care of the practical work of managing and disposing of distressed assets. As a 
trial exercise, two central enterprises have already been converted into AMCs – State De-
                                                 
11 So far at least the share reform looks like a success. Without the state having sold any of its shares (apart 
from those it gave away as compensation), the Chinese stock exchanges appear to have been revitalised. Hav-
ing fallen almost continuously for 18 months, the Shanghai composite index began rising shortly after the 
share reform began in April 2005. Since July 2005, the broad index has risen by more than 150%. Mikael Mattlin         
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velopment & Investment Corp. (SDIC) and China Chengtong Group. On its website, 
Chengtong appears to envision its role mainly as restructuring the non-core and bad assets 
of the central enterprises in order to maximize the returns on state assets (Chengtong 
Group website). SASAC has also indicated that some other central enterprises may follow 
suit, while other AMCs may be specifically created for the purpose. Nevertheless, interna-
tional experiences of using AMCs to perform corporate restructuring are not favourable. 
World Bank economists have therefore advised that they should be used with caution, lim-
iting their role mainly to financial stabilization (Mako and Zhang 2004, p. 12). 
With the reform of the share structure, the aim of 'comprehensively listing' SOEs, 
and apparent government dissatisfaction with the investment decisions of the SOE holding 
companies, it would thus appear a distinct possibility that SASAC, with the assistance of 
AMCs, would assume many of the powers of the current directly state-owned holding 




5  Enhancing financial control  
over state-invested enterprises 
 
Mainstream Western views on the relative advantages of the market versus the state in al-
locating investments efficiently holds that a market-oriented financial system, in general, is 
more efficient in allocating capital than a state-dominated financial system, despite occa-
sional market failures. The Chinese government has throughout the reform period had a 
preference for active economic management, perhaps as a legacy of the planned economy. 
This active management has been particularly evident in macroeconomic policy and in 
bank lending. Based on the Chinese case, some scholars have even recently challenged the 
prevailing view that a centrally managed finance system is necessarily less efficient than a 
market-based one (Allen et al. 2004). 
One of the conspicuous features of China's decades long economic growth spurt is 
the very high ratio of investment to GDP, even compared with Japan, South Korea and 
Taiwan at a similar stage of economic development (Kwan 2004). While some economists 
disagree with the contention that China as a whole over-invests, the mainstream view BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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among scholars appears to be that the investment allocation system in China does not func-
tion well, as numerous cases of over-investment in various sectors of the economy indi-
cate.
13 Research has shown that Chinese domestic capital flows – especially capital based 
on loans from government-linked financial institutions – tend to favour relatively non-
productive SOE-heavy areas (Boyreau-Debray and Wei 2005, pp. 17–20; Phillips and Shen 
2005). A major share of bank loans are still directed to wholly or partly state-owned enter-
prises SOEs linked to local governments, for political rather than commercial reasons, with 
private enterprises receiving only 27% or loans (Farrell and Lund 2006, p. 6). 
Much of the discussion on China's overheating economy has focused on the high 
personal savings rate as an explanation for the country's high investment rates. Less noted 
is that China's corporate savings are also exceptionally high in international comparison, 
currently standing at around 33% of all bank deposits, and over 60% of GDP (calculated 
from People's Bank of China and PRC National Bureau of Statistics data). More impor-
tantly, with all the focus on bank lending as a cause of the overheating of the economy, it 
has been less widely recognised that bank lending actually funds only a relatively small 
proportion of new investment. Domestically raised loans funded only 18.8% of fixed asset 
investment (FAI) in 2005. A bigger reason for China's supernormal investment rates than 
bank lending behaviour are companies that reinvest most of their (and other companies) 
earnings in new investment projects, rather than distributing earnings as dividends or using 
the cash to strengthen their balance sheets. According to World Bank scholars, retained 
corporate earnings finance almost 75% of corporate investment and amount to around 20% 
of China's GDP (Kuijs 2006, pp. 9-11; International Monetary Fund 2005, p. 25). 
One of the main drivers of investment in recent years has been a triangular relation-
ship between state-owned companies with semi-monopolistic features enabling windfall 
profits, central government hesitancy towards imposing hard budget constraints on SOEs 
and collecting dividends from them, and local governments locked in heated competition 
for GDP growth and prone to local protectionism. While there are still many loss-making 
SOEs, the state-owned part of the economy has, on the whole, been producing solid profits 
in recent years, with SOE profits multiplying both in absolute terms and relative to the size 
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Recently, non-listed Shenyang Neusoft Group listed all its assets on the stock exchange through a share 
swap with its listed subsidiary Neusoft Co, in the process liquidating itself. 
13 Reliable assessments of the efficiency of Chinese domestic investment allocations are hampered by the fact 
that there are as yet very few publicly available quantitative assessments on the efficiency of the Chinese 
capital market (Boyreau-Debray and Wei 2005, p. 1). Mikael Mattlin         
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of the economy and government revenue (Figure 3).
14 Some corners of the state-owned 
economy are awash with cash and with every incentive to reinvest their profits (even if un-
profitably), but often with inadequate procedures for reaching sound re-investment deci-
sions. As a consequence, profits have often been ploughed into unprofitable and duplica-
tory investments. 
 


















total profits (RMB bn, left-hand scale) profits/government revenue (%, right-hand scale)
 
  Data source: NBS. 
 
Many among the mass of smaller SOEs are still loss-making or barely break even. The 
bulk of SOE profits are made in a handful of big SOEs, almost all of which are central en-
terprises. The biggest industrial profits in China, both absolutely and in relative terms, are 
currently made in sectors of the economy that are dominated by state-owned enterprises, 
such as the oil and petrochemical, energy and metal industries. Several of these industries 
retain semi-monopolistic features, dominated as they are by a handful of SOEs and often 
shielded from competition by administrative and legal measures. The steel industry is dif-
ferent in this respect. While the biggest companies in the steel industry, too, are SOEs, the 
industry also has numerous smaller players, and profit margins are therefore thinner. Table 
                                                 
14 One observer from the private equity community disagrees with the officially published profitability fig-
ures, arguing that they are artificially inflated by several accounting peculiarities (Shan 2006, pp. 29–32). BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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4 shows the cumulative profits of the most profitable industrial sectors in the period 2000–
2005, as well as the proportion of state ownership in China within each sector. 
 
Table 4 Cumulative industrial profits in the 15 most profitable industries in China 2000–2005, and state 
ownership share of industry revenue* 
 
Industry  Billion yuan (cum.)  State ownership 
Petroleum and natural gas extraction  893.7  95.5% 
Electricity, gas and water  382.4  99.3% 
Electronic, computers and telecom equipment  366.4  13.5% 
Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals  332.2  49.4% 
Transport equipment  315.1  52.5% 
Raw chemical materials  289.9  31.6% 
Electric machinery and equipment  218.1  11.2% 
Ordinary machinery  171.4  23.7% 
Tobacco processing 159.7  98.8% 
Non-metal mineral products  147.1  13.7% 
Textiles 140.4  7.6% 
Medical and pharmaceutical 137.0  27.7% 
Coal mining  112.4  71.4% 
Smelting and pressing of non-ferrous metals  105.8  36.2% 
Metal products  98.1  7.8% 
All other industries  932.0 - 
Sources: CEIC database, NBS China Statistical Yearbook 2006. 
* State ownership refers to the combined revenues of state-owned enterprises as a share of industry total revenue. Figures are for the 
year 2005. 
 
In 2005, the entire state-owned sector made a net profit of 644.7 billion yuan, according to 
the PRC National Bureau of Statistics figures. This figure is very close to the total profits 
recorded by central enterprises, 627.7 billion yuan (754.7 billion in 2006). The concentra-
tion of profits goes further. Among the central enterprises, the forty most profitable firms 
account for 95% of all profits, while the twelve most profitable firms made 78.8% of all 
central enterprise profits in 2005 (Table 5). Not surprisingly, in the SOE dividend debate, 
too, the focus has been on central enterprise dividends. 
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Table 5. The most profitable central enterprises in 2005 (total profits) 
 





























































Source: The profit figures were reported on an official website China.org.cn 11 July 2006, citing a SASAC study.  
 
The torrid pace of China's economic growth has led Chinese policymakers to the conclu-
sion that investment levels are too high. Central enterprises made a total of 1 trillion yuan 
(EUR 100 bn) in investments in the year 2004, accounting for almost 20% of all FAI in 
that year. In the first 11 months of 2006 the figure reached 1.005 trillion yuan.
15 Thus, 
while the number of central SOEs is limited, they account for a large share of investments, 
and also still enjoy a major share of loans extended by the SCBs. More importantly, since 
they are now under the direct management of SASAC with a mandate from the State 
Council, it should be easier for central government to influence the investments of this sec-
tor of the economy than either the foreign-invested sector or the privately invested sector, 
which receive little financing from state-owned lenders. As a consequence of a long series 
of administrative, corporate and fiscal reforms involving the SOEs, central government has 
lost many of the tools to directly guide the economy, while most investment decisions are 
taken in the interaction between corporations and local government. One motivation for 
central government in introducing the state assets management budget is to rein in duplica-
tion of investment projects, a practice that has been rampant in China. 
                                                 
15 Fixed asset investments by state-owned and state shareholding companies in 2005 totalled more than EUR 
400 billion. NBS, China Monthly Statistics 1/2006, p. 19; Xinhua, 7 January 2007. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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If companies have adequate internal systems in place to evaluate the profitability of 
future investment projects, re-investment of profits or raising of funds for investment 
should not be a cause for government concern. But while the quality of management and 
corporate governance have improved over the years, many SOEs still make investments 
that are either ill-advised in terms of their corporate focus, unprofitable, or downright cor-
rupt. The high profitability enjoyed by some central enterprises is often converted into new 
investment, as enterprises are able to retain a larger part of their profits than their peers in 
the West would, given that the Chinese government currently does not collect dividends on 
post-tax profits. Furthermore, given soft budget constraints,
16 companies often have ample 
incentives to reinvest profits. Investment is therefore kept at an abnormally high level. 
Chinese central government appears to have lost faith in the ability of SOEs to re-
invest profits prudently. SASAC appears to harbour the idea that they can do a better job in 
guiding state investment than company management can, at least at the strategic level. 
Consequently, a few years back SASAC set about developing a comprehensive framework 
for guiding SOE capital allocation decisions, in particular as regards investments and divi-
dends. However, the specifics of the project released to the public have come in a long 
trickle with substantial uncertainties still remaining. A decision to collect dividends from 
SOEs was apparently already made in 2005. Some provincial and municipal SASAC of-
fices, including at least Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen, have already gained operational 
control over local SOE budgets and profits as a pilot exercise prior to extending the same 
practice to the national level. In December 2006, the Finance Minister announced that in 
2007 directly state-controlled central enterprises as well as local enterprises would begin to 
compile the state assets management budget on a trial basis. Eventually, the system will 
also cover state-invested financial institutions, including the SCBs. 
However, the decision to start collecting dividends gave rise to strong disputes due 
to conflicts of interest. The principal protagonists were SASAC, which originally wanted 
control over all or most SOE dividends, the Ministry of Finance, which wanted the pro-
ceeds included in the regular state budget, and SOE managers who more or less opposed 
the whole idea (Naughton 2006, p. 12). In the intra-bureaucracy wrangling, the MoF bar-
gaining position would appear to be stronger, as SASAC decisions still need to be counter-
signed by the MoF in order to take legal effect (Naughton 2005, p. 8). 
                                                 
16 In the definition by Kornai and Weibull, soft budget constraints implied a state that would semi-
automatically step in and rescue loss-making firms unwilling to shoulder the cost of their failure. See discus-
sion in Colombo and Valentinyi (2002, pp. 2–3). Mikael Mattlin         
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In June 2006, Chinese newspapers reported that a general agreement had been 
reached between SASAC and the MoF, whereby the MoF would continue to have overall 
control over SOE finances, while central SASAC would get control of the proceeds from 
central-level enterprise dividends and asset sales. However, as recently as September 2006, 
MoF and SASAC officials' statements on the issue appeared to contradict each other. Li 
Rongrong has nevertheless revealed that in order to ensure consistency in state budgeting 
and some oversight of SASAC's use of funds, the MoF will be responsible for approving 
SASAC's budget for state assets, which will then form a part of the general central gov-
ernment budget. It has also been announced that the general principles on SOE dividends 
will be published soon, with detailed regulations to follow later. 
As for the amount of dividends to be collected, there is no certainty as yet. Chinese 
state media has repeatedly reported that a ratio of 20% of net profits has been applied in 
the trial locations Beijing and Shanghai in 2006. Fujian provincial media have also re-
ported the figure of 20% of distributable profits. However, this was said to be a minimum 
level for dividends, the precise amount being determined in each instance by the provincial 
SASAC based on general state asset restructuring needs and the specific circumstances of 
each enterprise (Fujian ribao 1 January 2007). Assuming a 20% general dividend rate were 
also to be applied to central enterprises, that would give SASAC ample ammunition to 
tackle industrial restructuring, providing at least EUR 10 billion annually, at current profit-
ability levels. However, an oil company executive was recently quoted as saying that SA-
SAC would collect only 5–8% of the profits of the main oil companies (Forbes 1 Decem-
ber 2006). Li Rongrong recently mentioned that different dividend levels will be deter-
mined and applied based on enterprise categorisations (分类收取). Dividend ratios will 
most likely be determined according to specific circumstances. 
Judging from the dividend debate so far, the decision on which institution gains 
control over the dividends, and to what extent, will have an effect on the state's future 
spending priorities. The MoF appears to be favouring using the bulk of the dividend in-
come to fund the National Council for Social Security Fund (NCSSF) created in 2000, 
while SASAC would rather spend the money on its own priority areas, namely restructur-
ing domestic industries, investing in new strategic investment priorities and funding public 
works projects. It had earlier been reported that 10% of government-held shares in listed 
SOEs would be transferred to the NCSSF, thereby allowing the Fund to collect dividends 
directly, and central SASAC had instructed local SASACs to study the possibility. Never-BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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theless, SASAC appears to have concluded that this plan is not the best option. SASAC 
recently announced that it does not support transferring shares directly to the NCSSF, as 
this may endanger its goal of maintaining absolute state control in certain industries. In-
stead, SASAC would prefer making cash contributions to the NCSSF from the dividend 
earnings it receives. Meanwhile, SASAC's encouragement of full stock market listings and 
its intention to assume direct ownership in some listed SOEs may be a way to allow central 
government to collect dividends directly from the profitable listed SOEs, rather than indi-
rectly through their non-listed parent companies. 
SASAC has grouped central enterprises into various categories and defined 'core 
industries' for each company. Beginning in 2004, SASAC has released this information in 
five batches, with some 22 companies still being uncategorised at the time of writing (Ta-
ble 5). SASAC restricts core business areas, even in the case of large enterprises, to a 
maximum of three. If implemented according to SASAC's orders, the exercise will poten-
tially have several practical implications. When the state assets management budget is in 
full use, side-business investments will be strictly controlled, with SASAC reserving to 
itself the right to deny enterprise investments when these are deemed as not serving the 
strategic objectives of the core business. According to related regulations, side-business 
investments have to be reviewed and approved by SASAC, while core business investment 
only needs to be reported to SASAC (Appendix 1, Document 4). Thus, the rules on in-
vestments and business definitions are designed to directly tackle the central enterprises' 
widespread practice of using their surplus cash to diversify into businesses that have no 
relation to the core business. However, according to SASAC, side-business investments 
only accounted for 3–4% of all central enterprise investments in 2005, so the impact of 
these regulations on overall corporate investment levels should be limited. 
In addition, in conjunction with SASAC's goal of listing related businesses within 
an enterprise comprehensively on the market, companies with separately listed subsidiaries 
that do not fall within the core business areas will probably be pressed to divest these non-
core subsidiaries, as Sinopec has already done in some cases. 
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SASAC characterisation  Core businesses Company  examples 
First 
(49) 
Core businesses are related 
to national security and other 
industries key to the lifeline 
of the national economy  
Petroleum, electricity, steel and 
colour metals, heavy machinery, 
auto, airlines, telecom, military, 
shipping 
Sinopec, CNOOC, State Grid, 
Dongfeng Motor, Minmetals, 
Baosteel, China Airlines, China 
Telecom, China Mobile, COSCO 
Second 
(13)  
Core businesses are related 
to national security and other 
industries key to the lifeline 
of the national economy  




Sinochem, State Grain Reserves, 
China Merchants Logistics 
Third 
(35)  
Mostly relatively large com-
panies with well-defined 
main businesses 
Real estate, construction, infra-
structure, environmental engi-
neering, tourism, chemicals, 
textiles 
 
Sinomach, China Railway Engi-
neering, Chengtong Group, 






Light industry (textiles, food, 
handicrafts) and various service 
industries (real estate develop-
ment, tourism, trading) 
China Travel Service (CTS), 
China Satcom, Chinatex 
Fifth 
(25) 
---  Industrial research and design 
 
Central Iron & Steel Research 
Institute (CISRI), China Coal 
Research Institute, China Elec-
tronics Engineering Design Insti-
tute 
Note: At the time of writing, 22 companies were still uncategorised and one company was listed in two batches. 
 
In the spring of 2006, SASAC director Li Rongrong stated with regard to defining core 
businesses that, in the future, state assets would be concentrated in four economic areas: in 
those industries that are related to national security and key to the lifeline of the economy; 
in those areas that possess competitive advantages or may develop into future leading in-
dustries; on big internationally competitive industrial groups and companies; and on the 
core businesses of central enterprises. The first of these criteria uses word for word the 
same expression as the characterisation of the companies in the first two batches in Table 
6, and the same definition as was used for the strategic industries. This, of course, is no 
coincidence. This characterisation was already stipulated during the 15
th Party Congress 
(1997), which decided that the state has to retain control of sectors that concern national 
security, the national economic lifeline, basic infrastructure, key resources and strategic 
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If SASAC gets control over a major part of SOE dividends and asset divestment 
proceeds, then it appears that these will be concentrated on strengthening the already 
strong among the SOEs, focusing on a small group of major companies and channelling 
support to them.
17 SASAC officials have repeatedly stated that central enterprises need to 
merge in order to achieve a scale at which they can compete globally. The vision SASAC 
appears to hold for the future management of central enterprises looks remarkably similar 
to Singapore's new vision for Finance Ministry-owned Temasek and the companies linked 
to it. According to Mako and Zhang (2004, p. 9), a Singaporean economic review commit-
tee in May 2002 recommended that Temasek (which SASAC officials repeatedly refer to 
as an example) should help Singapore's government-linked companies to internationalise 
their core businesses and grow into globally competitive companies anchored in Singapore. 
Furthermore, the government should continue to own 'critical resources', while selling 
stakes in less important companies. 
To date, the number of central enterprises has been reduced from an original 196 to 
159. However, SASAC officials are not content with this pace. In October 2004, SASAC 
director Li Rongrong stated that companies would need to grow to being among the three 
largest companies in their fields in the Chinese market. If they could not achieve this goal 
within three years, SASAC would find a partner for them, effectively merging companies 
by decree. The most likely candidates for companies that would form the core of these fu-
ture Chinese mega-companies are those listed in the first batch in SASAC's own categori-
sation framework defining enterprise core businesses, and operating in the industries de-
fined as strategic or pillar industries. Among these are almost all the largest, most competi-




                                                 
17 Jingji cankao bao 28 February 2006 and Zhongguo zhengjuan bao 14 March 2006.  Mikael Mattlin         
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6  Conclusions 
 
This paper has reviewed recent policy and regulatory developments with regard to central 
government control over the central enterprises. While several key developments have still 
not been finally settled, enough data exists to draw some tentative conclusions as to the 
direction of the Chinese central government's ownership policy. 
The long process of loosening the ties between SOEs and central government that 
started with the onset of China's economic reforms appears to have reached a turning point. 
While most of the previous reform efforts resulted in enhanced managerial and/or local 
government control over enterprise management and financial decisions, several recent ini-
tiatives by SASAC specifically and central government more generally appear aimed at re-
establishing central government authority over the crème de la crème of SOEs. In some 
ways, these efforts are only giving teeth to a strategic direction stipulated already in the 
mid-1990s on letting go of the small, while grasping the large SOEs. 
The documents reviewed for this paper clearly suggest that central government is 
strengthening its control of a handful of the biggest and most profitable Chinese compa-
nies. One of the first steps in this development was centralising the ownership and supervi-
sion of 196 SOEs under central SASAC. SASAC has taken on an increasingly active role 
in the strategic management and restructuring of these companies, with a stated aim of re-
ducing their number to 30–50 globally competitive companies, by forced mergers if neces-
sary, and by channelling state resources into strengthening the global competitiveness of 
these companies. This is in line with China's new five-year plan published last year, which 
put heavy emphasis on developing indigenous Chinese technological and innovation capa-
bilities (Appendix 1, documents 19 and 21). SASAC itself will also apparently soon begin 
assuming direct ownership of some listed SOEs, possibly indicating that it intends to take 
over some of the powers from the wholly state-owned parent companies, thereby getting 
closer to the actual source of SOE earnings. 
A second step has been stipulating clearer demarcations on which industries the 
government considers strategic. The recently released shortlist of seven strategic industries 
implies that at least 40–50 companies on the central enterprise list will be indefinitely off 
limits to foreign or private control, as will probably also be the 70 companies operating in 
industries characterised as 'pillar' industries. Companies operating in the strategic indus-
tries tend to be the largest among the central enterprises. Intriguingly, almost all the profits BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 
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among central enterprises and most of the profits in the state-owned sector of the economy 
as a whole are currently made by the top forty central enterprises. A number of indicators 
therefore suggest that central government has concluded that less is more. By controlling 
tightly a small fraction of all SOEs, the state can maintain disproportionate control over 
profits, investments and the national economy, thus enabling it to let go of many small 
SOEs without sacrificing much control. 
However, there is an inherent paradox. SASAC directors continually emphasize 
that they are in the process of separating the functions of government and corporation. 
While this may be true with regard to the entire state-invested economy – especially if the 
government begins actively selling off non-core companies – it is dubious with regard to 
the central enterprises reviewed in this paper. If anything, the government's recent actions 
and numerous policy papers and statements on strengthening the state's hold of strategic 
industries and channelling state assets to these sectors, provides fuel to critics who argue 
that big Chinese state-owned enterprises have a dual role as both corporations and arms of 
the state machinery. A tit-for-tat on foreign acquisitions following CNOOC's failed Unocal 
acquisition may result in the Chinese government interpreting national and economic secu-
rity more broadly than is common, thus effectively putting a brake on foreign investments 
in many industries. 
Finally, while central government has clearly signalled its determination to get 
tighter control over SOE profits and investments, the question of who gets control over 
SOE profits has succumbed to prolonged intra-bureaucracy wrangling. There still appear to 
be differences in the positions of the MoF and SASAC even after years of negotiations. In 
order for SASAC to be able to implement the ambitious SOE restructuring agenda it has 
set for itself, it will need both effective ownership control of the central enterprises and a 
significant share of the earnings generated as dividends and divestment proceeds. Judging 
by its officials' statements, SASAC itself appears to believe it will eventually get opera-
tional control of most of the funds generated from Chinese state assets. Were this to hap-
pen, SASAC would become one of the biggest and most powerful organisations for gov-
ernment-sanctioned industrial restructuring in recent history. Mikael Mattlin         
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Appendix 1 Laws and administrative directives reviewed for this paper18 
 
Laws and law-like administrative directives
19 
 
1)  公司法 Company law, new version (law, took effect 1/2006) 
2)  公司法 Company law, old version (law, 1999) 
3)  反垄断法 Anti-monopoly law (law draft, under review) 
4)  中央企业投资监督管理暂行办法 Central enterprises investment supervision and 
management (temporary directive, 7/2006) 
5)  上海市国有资产收益收缴管理试行办法 Trial directive on Shanghai city state as-
sets revenue and dividend management (trial directive, 11/2005) 
6)  上市公司股权分置改革管理办法 Directive on listed companies' share structure 
reform (directive, 2005) 
7)  上市公司收购管理办法 Directive on the takeover of listed companies (directive, 
9/2006) 
8)  地方国有资产监管工作指导监督暂行办法 Temporary directive on the guidance 
and supervision of local state assets management work (temporary directive, 
5/2006) 
9)  企业国有资产监督管理暂行条例 Interim regulations on the management of en-
terprise state-owned assets (regulation, 5/2003) 
 
Other administrative regulations 
 
10) 国有资产监督管理委员会令 State assets supervision and management committee 
(order, 4/2006) 
11) 国务院关于试行国有资本经营预算的意见 State Council opinion on the trial 
State Assets Management Budget (opinion, not yet published) 
12) 外国投资者并购境内企业暂行规定 Regulations on foreign mergers and acquisi-
tions (temporary stipulation, 9/2006) 
13) 国务院关于机构设置的通知 State Council circular on organisational set-up (cir-
cular, 3/2003) 
14) 关于上市公司股权分置改革的指导意见 Guiding opinions on the share reform of 
listed enterprises (opinion, 8/2005) 
                                                 
18 In some cases, the law was only in draft form, or the document has not been publicly available. In this case 
several secondary sources were relied on. 
19 The Chinese administrative system has an elaborate hierarchic classification of the documents it produces. 
Apart from regular laws that usually take very long to pass and law-like administrative directives, there is a 
hierarchy of administrative documents. Following Lieberthal (1995, p. 177), this hierarchy – in descending 
order of bindingness – is order (命令), instruction (指示), circular (通知) and opinion (意见). In the 
list above, the nature of the document and month of publication or taking effect can be found in brackets. Mikael Mattlin         
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15) 关于上市公司股权分置改革中国有股股权管理有关问题的通知 Circular on 
some issues related to the management of state-held shares in the reform of listed 
enterprises' non-tradable shares (circular, 9/2005) 
16) 行政单位国有资产管理暂行办法 Provisional measures on the management of 
administrative organs' state assets (5/2006) 
17) 外国投资者并购境内企业暂行规定 Provisional measures on mergers and acquisi-
tions of domestic enterprises by foreign investors (temporary stipulation, 4/2003) 
18) 关于推进国有资本调整和国有企业重组的指导意见 Guiding opinion on encour-
aging transformation and restructuring of the state-owned capital (opinion, 
12/2006) 
19) 关于企业国有产权转让有关事项的通知 Circular on matters relating to the enter-
prises' transfers of state-assets (circular, 12/2006) 
20) 外商投资产业指导目录 Catalogue for the guidance of foreign investment indus-




21) 国民经济和社会发展第十一个五年规划纲要 (草案) Guidelines for the 11
th 
five-year plan (3/2006) 
22) 中国利用外资‘十一五'规划 The 11
th five-year plan for China's use of FDI 
(11/2006) 
23) 钢铁产业发展政策 Steel industry policy (2005) 
24)  船舶工业中长期发展规划 Shipping industry plan (2006; details not yet pub-
lished) 
25)  国务院关于加快振兴装备制造业的若干意见 Proposals for equipment manufac-
turing industry (6/2006) 
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Appendix 2 Economic areas with foreign ownership 
    restrictions in the current Investment Catalogue20 
 
Economic areas where the Chinese partner must hold a majority of shares 
Design and manufacture of civil planes, civil helicopters, aeroplane engines, civil airborne 
equipment, civil carrier rockets and civil satellites, and manufacture of civil satellites' ef-
fective payload 
Construction and management of nuclear-power plants, grid of national trunk railways, 
metro and city light rail 
Development and production of grain (including potatoes), cotton and oilseed 
Exploring and mining of special and rare kinds of coal 
Printing of publications (except printing of package decoration) 
Production of material medicines for addictive narcotics and psychoactive drugs 
Railway passenger transportation companies 
General aviation companies engaging in photographing, prospecting and industry 
Construction and operation of cinemas 
Production and publication of broadcasting and TV programmes and film-making 
Mapping companies 
Air transportation companies 
Economic areas where only equity joint or contractual joint ventures are allowed 
Exploration and exploitation of gold mines with low quality or difficult to exploit 
Prospecting and exploitation of copper ores, plumbum ores, zinc ores and aluminium ores 
(WFOE are permitted in the western regions) 
Project based on the mode of integration of forest and paper with an annual production 
capacity of over 300 thousand tons of chemical wood pulp or an annual production capac-
ity of over 100 thousand tons of chemical mechanical wood pulp 
Production of high-quality paper and cardboard  
Smelting of gold mines with low quality or difficult to exploit (WFOE are permitted in 
the western regions) 
Power equipment: manufacture of super-critical units of over 600,000 kW, large gas tur-
bines, gas-steam combined cycle power equipment of over 100,000 kW, coal gasification 
combined cycle technique and equipment (IGCC), pressure boost fluidised bed (PFBC), 
large scale air cooling generating units of over 600,000 kW, large scale cycle fluidised 
bed (CFB) boilers 
Hydropower plant equipment: manufacture of large pump-storage power units of 150,000 
kW and over, large tubular turbine units of 150,000 kW or over 
                                                 
20 Information extracted from the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (2004). Mikael Mattlin         
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Nuclear-power plant equipment: manufacture of power units of 600,000 kW or over 
Power transmitting and transforming equipment: manufacture of super high voltage DC 
power transmitting and transforming equipment of 500 kW or over 
Manufacture of receiving equipment for satellite navigation and key components 
Manufacture of equipment for air traffic control systems 
Construction and management of feeder railways, local railways and related bridges, tun-
nels and ferry facilities 
General aviation companies for agriculture, forestry and fisheries 
Higher education institutes 
Processing the logs of precious varieties of tree 
Exploring and mining of minerals such as wolfram, tin, antimony, molybdenum, barite, 
fluorite 
Smelting and separation of rare earth metals 
Manufacture of truck cranes of less than 50 tons 
Development of pieces of land 
Market research  
Medical treatment establishments 
Education establishments for senior high school students 
Economic areas where the Chinese counterpart must hold a relative majority of 
shares 
Production of ethylene with an annual production capacity of 600 thousand tons or over 
Repair, design and manufacture of special vessels, high-performance vessels 
Design and manufacture of equipment and accessories for high-speed diesel engines, aux-
iliary engines, radio communication and navigation for vessels 
Construction and management of key water control projects for comprehensive utilization 
Construction and management of civil airports 
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Appendix 3  New industry-specific policy developments related to foreign M&As 
 
Steel industry 
In 2005, China published a steel policy paper banning foreign control – defined as owning 
a majority of shares – of Chinese steel makers. No such restrictions were included in the 
Investment Catalogue currently in effect. The steel industry is also reportedly included in a 




In June 2006, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued guide-
lines for the development of the domestic heavy equipment manufacturing industry (Ap-
pendix 1, Document 25). The guidelines define the machinery industry as an important 'pil-
lar industry' and encourage state-owned enterprises to drive industry restructuring through 
mergers and acquisitions, ensuring that the government's ownership control of the industry 
is maintained. Furthermore, key enterprises within the sector now need to seek approval 
from the State Council before transferring ownership control. 
 
Shipbuilding industry 
In September 2006, the NDRC and the Ministry of Defence released a new industry devel-
opment plan. According to this, foreign companies can participate in industry restructuring 
and funding of shipbuilding enterprises, medium- and low-speed ship diesel engine manu-
facturing enterprises and crankshaft manufacturing, as long as they do not hold above 49% 
of the shares. M&As involving overseas enterprises, overseas-funded enterprises in China, 
or a foreign-controlled JV merging with a domestic company are to be treated as newly 
created joint ventures. In addition, JVs also have to set up a technical centre with the pur-
pose of absorbing technologies transferred by foreign investors to China. In the Investment 
Catalogue, foreign participation in shipbuilding of ordinary vessels is not explicitly re-
stricted (implying that it is allowed). 
 
Car industry 
The 2004 Car Industry Policy confirmed a 50/50 ownership requirement, against the ex-
pectation of a loosening of ownership restrictions on foreign car producers. The same pol-
icy paper further restricted the market access of foreign companies by limiting the number 
of ventures they were allowed to establish and by forcing the localisation of component 
production (Borgonjon 2006, pp. 49–50). In a policy paper on foreign investment released 
as part of the 11
th five-year plan, further foreign investments in the car industry were en-




In the paper industry, the government in 2005 changed the earlier rule that allowed fine 
paper and board mills to operate without a Chinese joint venture partner, so that new ven-
tures now require a local partner. Mikael Mattlin         
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Appendix 4  The main powers of the agencies involved in approving foreign M&As 
 
Ministry of Commerce (MofCom) 
According to the new guidelines on foreign acquisitions that took effect on 8 September 
2006, MofCom (in cooperation with the SAIC) is the key government organ in approving 
or denying foreign mergers and acquisitions of Chinese state-owned as well as private en-
terprises. Acquiring enterprises need to report their plans to MofCom in a wide variety of 
circumstances, and the regulations give MofCom considerable discretion to deny acquisi-
tions. MofCom has announced that it will in the future more closely supervise foreign ac-
quisitions of China's 'backbone' enterprises. 
 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
SASAC is tasked with protecting the value of state assets, including SOEs. SASAC evalu-
ates and advises MofCom on foreign acquisitions of SOEs, in particular as to whether the 
acquisition adheres to appropriate procedures and whether the price received from the asset 
sale is to be considered 'fair', a fair price implying a minimum of 90% of the net asset value 
of the acquired company. 
 
China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
CSRC makes rules on acquisitions of companies listed on the Chinese stock exchanges. It 
examines acquisitions if the target company is a publicly listed company and undertakes 
studies of the financial strength and debt levels of the acquiring company. CSRC also scru-
tinises management buy-outs. 
 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
CBRC has to ratify acquisitions or strategic investments in Chinese banks by foreign fi-
nancial institutions. 
 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
Together with MofCom, the NDRC needs to approve foreign investment project applica-
tions. It also supervises the restructuring of SOEs. NDRC has issued several policy papers 
and guidelines pertaining to the development of Chinese industries and the involvement of 
foreign enterprises in these, and was probably involved in drafting the new rules on foreign 
acquisitions. 
 
Special agency in the future? 
A specialised ministerial-level agency below the State Council has been proposed to exam-
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